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TOTAL JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE*
For want of a better term, I should like to discuss what I
call "Total Justice". It will do no harm first to recall the
different meanings and methods of law and justice. Then, I
think, we shall have placed ourselves in a state of mind to
explore a particular dark corner of the law today and to con-
sider what may be done about it.
Except for the totalitarians, we all base our law and law
making upon the premise that there is a difference between
right and wrong, between justice and iniquity, between good-
ness and sin. Occasionally, there is some attempt to make it
appear that law is not necessarily right, nor just, nor good.
Some legal scholars have distinguished between law and
morals. Other learned men have delighted in distinguishing
between justice and mercy. Perhaps a man from Mars
would be puzzled by these seeming contradictions. But we
know that they represent shades of meaning rather than con-
flicts. They express our self-criticism. They mean that man-
made law and man-made justice have a natural difficulty
keeping up with morals, mercy, and the Christian ideal of
perfection.
A more tangible difficulty lies in the several very different
methods which go to make up our legal system. Of these,
presumably no factor is more disillusioning than the fact
that law must be applied by mere men to inexorably concrete
cases. Thus we have on the one hand a plea for an ideal
"government of laws and not of men" although there never
was and never can be such a government; and on the other
hand we have cynical surrender to thinly veiled anarchy or
to the dictatorship of officialdom. Those are not so much
conflicting points of view as they are the usual contrast of
*Originally delivered as a speech at the annual Senior Banquet of the Notre
Dame Law Club, January 21, 1949.
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the high, hard goal, on the one hand-never fully attainable
but infinitely worth while-with the dark, easy, barbaric
level on the other. On this continent we have chosen the
hard ideal rather than the easy level.
Still a third mooted premise of our legal system is the
statement, or writing down, of our law. In ancient times
when men's minds and words were more brutal and blunt
than they are today, the situation was a dramatic one. There
was, for example, the classic struggle in Republican Rome
to see whether the law should remain a mystery in the hands
of the pagan priesthood or be written down for all to se6 and
know and rely upon. The victory which gave the people of
Rome their crude twelve tables is one of the earliest historic
landmarks of government under law. Not only is there an
almost perennial struggle throughout subsequent history as
to how far the law should be thus written, but the difference
has been refined and complicated by the further questions
whether it should be written by kings, by legislators, by
jfidges, or by less well-defined State functionaries.
Let us consider whether the law should be written by legis-
lators or by judges. An example and contrast will perhaps
shed more light than any argument of mine. In England
the law is indisputably made by the legislature and, as a con-
sequence, courts merely construe and apply the very detailed
statutes, as written by Parliament, to the facts they find in
particular cases. There is no significant talk of "judge-
made" law there. The courts do not have an overriding con-
stitution to construe and apply, and for that reason they are
not concerned with broad economic questions de novo. In-
deed, lawyers do not even file briefs with the English courts;
instead, after only oral argument, the judgment is almost in-
variably announced forthwith from the bench.
But in the United States we have a legal tradition which
favors either judge-made or administrator-made law. Yet,
so far as judge-made law is concerned, this 'tradition is now
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rather largely honored in the breach. Congress and the
forty-eight state legislatures produce the greater weight of
law, although I do not know that they surpass the courts in
word count. This situation was not always with us. In the
last century the subject was fiercely debated for a period of
years by the noted lawyers, David Dudley Field and James
Coolidge Carter, in New York, with the nation's entire legal
profession as the audience. Although Carter appeared to
win most of his point in New York, Field's codes have been
adopted in substantial part in nearly half the states of the
union, and his idea of periodic legislative codification and re-
vision of the law has won avowed or tacit acceptance in every
jurisdiction in America. It would therefore appear fair to
say that our law in the Nineteenth Century tended to be
judge-made, but in the Twentieth Century it is primarily
legislature-made. That change simply evidences, far more
than words of mine could, our gradual conversion to the
theory that the law should be stated in writing by the
people's representatives so far as the latter find it feasible to
do so.
But we have now in this country a new phase of the law,
in which these old struggles in the development of our legal
system are being reenacted. In the field of administrative law
we are just reaching the question as to how far the legislature
should go in prescribing the rules of the game. This is not
because the legislatures have been dilatory, but because ad-
ministrative law is new in its significant scope and impact.
It is a sign of growth and virility of our legal system that it
should rebuild itself around each new legal field. Nor will
such readjustment smother the budding field of administra-
tive law. It will strengthen it by giving it recognition in our
legal system and the tools to perform its task. Administra-
tive agencies will continue to receive delegated powers. They
will continue to adjudicate cases and issue what might be
termed "sub-legislation". But the legal framework with-
in which they operate will be perfected by a statutory
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
accretion slowly designed in the light of experience, reason,
and the needs of modern government. This inevitable de-
velopment may be achieved in major part in our time.
On the foregoing general background I venture to draw
the conclusion that our people demand that our law be writ-
ten, adaptable, and understandable. To the extent that it
falls short of that standard, it does not represent total justice.
But of course this does not mean that there is not a place for
sound discretion case by case, as well as a place for precise
legal rules. The cry of history and of reason is that we write
and revise our laws as precisely as we may, so that they shall
be as understandable as possible to the millions whose lives
and fortunes they govern.
This continent-and the globe itself-have been so shaken
by domestic and international crises for nearly twenty years
that we are apt to overlook what has been done here in our
own land to improve the administration of justice. Undoubt-
edly it would surprise many people in other parts of the
world to learn that, in addition to weathering depression and
war, we had been able to make vast improvements in our
legal system in the current generation. I should like to de-
vote the second half of my remarks to the achievements, and
the future, of one such line of development which has already
brought order out of chaos in a large segment of our federal
law.
You will recall that we were hardly out of the depths of
the Great Depression when, by the Rules Act of 1934, Con-
gress provided for the formulation and operation of one set
of uniform and simplified rules of Civil Procedure for all the
Federal trial courts. Not only was that effort successful, but
it finally closed the breach between law and equity which had
prevailed for some two hundred years. The legal profession
has now been enjoying that simplified system for over a dec-
ade, and not a single voice has been raised to demand a re-
turn to the old days.
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Indeed, so successful has that bitterly fought reform
proved to be, that in 1938 a similar project was proposed for
the field of federal criminal law. Accordingly, we now have
uniformity of practice and procedure in such widely different
fields as law, equity, admiralty, and criminal law. Variation
and complexity have been reduced to an understandable
system. A few rule books which any lawyer can obtain
have replaced great sets of speculative discourses on the
morass of federal practice and procedure. Thus our law has
developed in the direction of consolidating and simplifying
and explaining. Not the least of our pride in this achieve-
ment should rest upon the fact that these simplified restate-
ments of the law were formulated in the first instance by the
voluntary and uncompensated labors of lawyers and scholars
acting in an advisory capacity. It is perhaps not too much
to venture to say that this achievement represents democ-
racy at its best.
But I should regard myself as remiss if I were to remain
content to point with just pride at what has been so splen-
didly done. For I know that our labors to maintain and im-
prove justice are never finished. Moreover, there are today
dark forces at work over most of the earth who preach not
only against law and against order, but who insist that the
appointed agents of the state are the sole and infallible
masters of human destiny. For that reason I shudder to
think that any responsible servant of democracy, be he
Democrat or Republican or Bureaucrat, would want to leave
any stone unturned to prevent the development of a lawless
administrative law in this country. Yet even our process of
simplifying and unifying the rules of practice and procedure
has stopped short of administrative agencies.
It is no answer to say that we are engaged in other more
important works of post-war legal rehabilitation. The sit-
uation recalls the remark of that eloquent advocate of law re-
form who, reminding his hearers of the boast that Augustus
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had found Rome a city of brick and left it a city of marble,
noted how much greater would have been Caesar's glory if
he could have said that he found
Law dear, and left it cheap; found it a sealed
book, left it a living letter; found it the patrimony of
the rich, left it the inheritance of the poor; found it
the two edged sword of craft and oppression, left it
the staff of honesty and the chief of innocence.
I venture to say that the same would be true here today,
even though our dwellings remain scarce and of wood instead
of brick, for what good will many mansions do us if the legal
fibre of the modern democratic state is to weaken and give
way little by little?
Indeed, I doubt that the modern administrative state has
much further to go unless it first puts its administrative
house in order. Our war time experience alone demonstrates
that there is a limit to the patience of our people, even in
times of emergency. Unless better public relations can be
achieved by our administrative agencies, there will be a lack
of ability on the part of administration to meet new prob-
lems of society or to win the necessary acceptance of extend-
ed government. Consequently, in the matter of federal legal
procedure alone, we are in the position of having one weak
link in the precious chain which holds together the whole
mechanism for the administration of federal justice.
This is not the place to go into further detail. It will suf-
fice for the moment if I say that, after long study and con-
sideration, I propose to introduce in Congress, immediately,
a bill "To Provide General Rules of Practice and Procedure
Before Federal Agencies". With essential differentiations,
this bill is modeled after the statutes of 1934 and 1938 which
implemented a similar purpose in the fields of civil and crim-
inal procedure in federal courts. It is my hope that by en-
actment of the legislation which I propose we shall demon-
strate that we are capable of having total justice-that our
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determination to unify and simplify practice and procedure
can be successfully applied throughout all our instrumentali-
ties of justice including the administrative agencies. But it
will be no simple task. It will test our best legal judgment
and ingenuity. It will be a creative undertaking of high
order.
Of course we shall have doubters and some opponents,
as well as many who will be indifferent. They will be well-
meaning folks, no doubt. But, in some part at least, they
will consciously or unconsciously reflect various common at-
titudes against law, against congressional legislation if it does
more than appropriate money or grant powers, against the
idea of simplicity or uniformity, against anything which may
limit administrative authority to operate as it chooses. There
will be talk that we need more justice and less law, that the
project will be too difficult or too expensive, or that it will
place administrative agencies in a "straight jacket". The
answer to most of these arguments and fears is simply that
all will depend on how well the job is done. Far more diffi-
cult undertakings have been proposed in Washington during
the last fifteen years, and none have been rejected because
execution would pose serious problems. Indeed, what I pro-
pose is a minor challenge compared with the problems of ad-
ministration in uniform minimum wages, registrations for se-
curity issues, maximum commodity prices, limited agricul-
tural acreage, and so on.
The objective end of all law is the rendition of justice,
even to the most lowly human being. If law takes not its
spirit from the fountain of all knowledge then it, the law so-
called, falls short of total justice. In no phase of the law
is there more impingement with man in his every day activity
than in the operation of administrative law. Here we have
human effort brought before the state to have its rights as-
sured and its wrongs redressed. Thus we are confronted
with the question of the care and accuracy which must pre-
cede judgment or conclusion.
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The people must be assured of the righteousness of the
arbiter and the uniformity of the rule applied. So you may
appreciate our anxiety to set the law of administrative pro-
cedure down so that he who runs may read; and, reading,
know the truth expressed by His Eminence, James Cardinal
Gibbons of happy memory, when he said,
The law is not the people, the people is not the law.
The law is the spirit of justice governing the people,
and its application to individuals, to associations, to
every form of civil life, must be so hedged round with
reverence and security that the civil courts in an hour
of popular passion may protect all the people from the
tyranny of what might be a lawless majority.
In this hour of social and political revolution when law is
loose and unstable, when individual human liberty is lightly
dealt with, when property rights are precarious, when God,
the source of life and law, is dared and denied, this nation
at the head of the nations of the world must hold high the
torch that will shed light into the dark places of legal pro-
cedure, must meet the onslaught of lawlessness by assuring
to the world and to our people the rights that God intended
for those who bear his image and likeness.
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